Wehrmachtbericht
(Armed Forces Report)
Manpower in Germany in WWII
Manpower in Germany in World War II (Thousands)
Year Field Forces Repl. Army Air Force Navy Waffen SS Foreign Units Non-Combatants Wehrmacht Total Nazi Party Officials War Industry Total in War Effort
1939 2,740 965 400 50 35 -- 500 4,690 501 38,725 43,916
1940 3,650 900 1,200 250 50 -- 550 6,600 362 35,014 41,976
1941 3,800 1,200 1,680 404 150 20 900 8,254 344 35,100 43,698
1942 4,000 1,800 1,700 580 230 70 1,200 9,658 348 34,528 44,444
1943 4,250 2,300 1,700 780 450 100 1,700 11,120 361 35,235 46,716
1944 4,000 2,510 1,500 810 600 350 2,300 12,240 343 34,815 47,398
1945 3,800 1,500 1,000 700 830 71 1,800 9,101 298 34,619 44,018
                       
Total population of "Greater Germany" at the time was about 80 million (some sources place the total German population at around 85 million)
The Non-Combatants include Operation Todt workers.

The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 18. (HERO)



 


Manpower in Germany in World War II (Yearly % Change)
Year Field Forces Repl. Army Air Force Navy Waffen SS Foreign Units Non-Combatants Wehrmacht Total Nazi Party Officials War Industry Total in War Effort
1939 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1940 33% -7% 300%  500%  43%  --  9%  41%   -28%  -10% -4% 
1941 4% 33% 40%  62%  300% --  39% 25%  -5%  0% 4% 
1942 5% 50% 1%  44%  62%   350%  33% 17%   1%  -2% 2% 
1943 6% 28% 0%  34%  34%  43%  42% 15%  4%  2% 5%
1944 -6% 9% -12%  4%  33%  350%  35% 10%   -5%  -1% 1%
1945 -5% -40% -33%  -14%  38%  -80%  -22% -26%  -13%  -1% -7% 
                       
 
 


Taking a look at the above chart, it is interesting to note that the German Replacement Army actually increased each and every year until 1945, when it dipped by a 1,000,000 men.  Looking at this more in depth is the chart below:

Losses and Replacements, German Field Army
  Losses   Replacements
  KIA WIA&NBC MIA Total   Individual Rehabs, New Formations, etc. Other Total
A.*                  
 6/22/41 - 6/30/42       1,980,000          
 7/1/42 - 6/30/43       1,985,000          
Total:       3,965,000   3,300,000 1,100,000   4,400,000
B.*                  
1943                  
 July       197,000         90,000
 August       225,000         77,000
 September       232,000         112,000
Total:       654,000         279,000
C.*                  
4/1-9/30/1942       971,000   924,000 328,000   1,252,000
10/1/42-3/31/43       1,324,000   710,000 405,000   1,115,000
4/1/43-9/30/43       995,000   652,000 529,000   1,181,000
10/1/43-3/31/44
   (estimates)
      1,200,000   605,000 515,000   1,120,000
Total:       4,490,000   2,891,000 1,777,000   4,668,000
D.*                  
 7/1/43-6/30/44       2,096,000   1,381,000 710,000   2,091,000
E.*                  
1944                  
 August       595,000   100,000      
 September       397,000   77,000      
 October       197,000   111,000      
Total:       1,189,000   288,000 380,000   668,000
F.*                  
1944                  
 August 42,000 165,000 78,000 285,000   113,000 196,000   309,000
 September 35,000 150,000 150,000 335,000   98,000 127,000   225,000
 October 32,000 134,000 69,000 235,000   97,000 95,000   222,000
 November 21,000 130,000 50,000 201,000   130,000 232,000 30,000 383,000
 December 23,100 114,000 39,400 176,500   156,500 30,000 21,000 196,000
Total: 153,100 693,000 386,400 1,232,500   594,500 680,000 51,000 1,335,000
G.*                  
 8/1/44-12/31/44       1,567,000   613,000 956,000   1,569,000
H.*                  
1945                  
 January 22,000 175,000 37,000 234,000   162,000 304,000 6,800 472,800
 February 55,000 266,000 102,000 423,000   135,000 216,000 17,000 368,000
Total: 77,000 441,000 139,000 657,000   297,000 520,000 23,800 840,800
                   
*Source: 
A.  Report, Army Chief of Staff, #5243, 15 August 1943; Soviet Voenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, 1963.
B.  Generalmaj. Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Personnel and Administration, MS. #P-005 (U.S. Army European Command, Historical Division), p. 97.
C.  Report, Commander, Replacement Army, 2 February 1944; Soviet Veonno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, #5, 1960.
D.  Report, Organizational Branch, General Staff, I/16580/44, 14 April 1944; T-78, Roll 414, Frames 6383123-6383125.
E.  Report, Organizational Branch, General Staff, 1/20326/44, 2 November 1944; T-78, Roll 411, Frames 6379642-3.
F.  Monthly Reports, Army General Office; T-78, Roll 397, Frames 6367090, et. al.
G. Report, Army General Office, 17 January 1945; T-78, Roll 397, Frame 6367064.
H.  Report, Organizational Branch, General Staff, #1493/45, 23 March 1945; Soviet Voenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, #5, 1960.
                   
                   

The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 52. (HERO)  (If you are interested in this subject, I would highly recommend purchasing the report from the DuPuy Institute, http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/)

Analysis of the Data Presented in the Losses and Replacements Chart Above
  Individual Replacements to Total Losses Rehabs/New Formations to Total Losses Total Replacements to Total Losses  
A.  6/22/41 - 6/30/43 .83 to 1 .28 to 1 1.11 to 1  
B.  July - September 1943 ? ? .43 to 1  
C.  4/1/42 - 3/31/44 .64 to 1 .40 to 1 1.04 to 1  
D.  7/1/43 - 6/30/44 .66 to 1 .34 to 1 1 to 1  
E.  August - October 1944 .24 to 1 .32 to 1 .56 to 1  
F.  August - December 1944 .48 to 1 .55 to 1 1.08 to 1  
G.  8/1/44 - 12/31/44 .39 to 1 .61 to 1 1 to 1  
H.  January - February 1945 .45 to 1 .79 to 1 1.28 to 1  
         


The first thing that should be quite obvious from looking at the above chart is that the Germans always had enough manpower to cover their losses.  According to the research done by the DuPuy Institute, it looks like the only times the Germans came up short on manpower was during the fall of 1943 and 1944.  Otherwise, over the course of the entire 12 months for 1943, and 1944 their replacments were technically enough to cover their losses.  But, Hitler had other ideas.  He took many of the replacements/convelescents and sent them to form new divisions instead (Stalin was guilty of this as well).  The result of this policy left many of the infantry divisions of the Germans (and the Soviets) understrength.  Was it the correct policy to build new units instead of focusing on keeping your existing units at full strength?  I tend to think it was a bad policy.  But there are exceptions of course.  I think it was prudent to form new motorized and panzer units, but it was highly unadvisable to keep forming new infantry formations-- especially the Luftwaffe infantry divisions.  That manpower was sorely needed within the Heer at the time. 


German Replacements Predictions and Performance
  Losses Replacements
  Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
1943:        
  July 200,000 210,000 110,000 107,000
  August 260,000 272,000 60,000 96,000
  September 190,000 238,000 120,000 149,000
  October 140,000 212,000 70,000 142,000
  November 120,000 177,000 95,000 134,000
  December 120,000 133,000 85,000 136,000
         
1944:        
  January 215,000 192,000 135,000 173,000
  February 200,000 191,000 115,000 122,000
  March 155,000 176,000 75,000 140,000
  April 120,000 121,000 131,000 141,500
  May 100,000 78,000 99,000 147,000
  June 90,000 165,000 90,000 146,000
         
Source:  Organizational Brance, General Staff, #1/17867/44, 2 July 1944; T-78, Roll 411, Frame 6379598

The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 54. (HERO)